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Abstract
The Domain Name System, DNS, is based on nameserver
delegations, which introduce complex and subtle depen-
dencies between names and nameservers. In this pa-
per, we present results from a large scale survey of DNS
that shows that these dependencies lead to a highly inse-
cure naming system. We report specifically on three as-
pects of DNS security: the properties of the DNS trusted
computing base, the extent and impact of existing vul-
nerabilities in the DNS infrastructure, and the ease with
which attacks against DNS can be launched. The sur-
vey shows that a typical name depends on 46 servers
on average, whose compromise can lead to domain hi-
jacks, and names belonging to some countries depend
on a few hundred nameservers. An attacker exploit-
ing well-documented vulnerabilities in DNS can hijack
more than 30% of the names appearing in the Yahoo and
DMOZ.org directories. And certain nameservers, espe-
cially in educational institutions, control as much as 10%
of the namespace.
1 Introduction
The Domain Name System (DNS), which resolves host
names to IP addresses, is critical to the integrity of ser-
vices and applications on the Internet. Yet, the design of
DNS poses security risks that are difficult to anticipate
and control. DNS relies on a delegation based architec-
ture, where resolution of a domain name might require
resolving the names of the servers responsible for that
name. Resolving these server names, in turn, depends
on additional name resolutions, creating complex inter-
dependencies among DNS servers. The resolution of a
single name is directly or indirectly controlled by several
servers, and compromise of any of them can severely af-
fect the integrity of DNS and the applications that rely
on it.
This paper studies the risks posed by the delegation
based architecture for DNS name resolution. Our study,
based on a large-scale survey of half a million domain
names, answers some of the basic questions about DNS
security: How many servers are involved in the resolu-
tion of a typical domain name? How easy is it to hijack
domains by exploiting well known security holes in DNS
servers? Which servers control the largest number of do-
main names, and how vulnerable are they?
Our survey exposes several new and surprising vul-
nerabilities in DNS. First, we find that the resolution
of a domain name depends on a large trusted comput-
ing base of 46 servers on average (not including the root
servers). Of that, only 2.2 servers are administered by
the nameowner on average; the remainder is outside the
direct control of the nameowner. Second, 30% of domain
names can be hijacked by compromising just two servers
each, where both servers contain well-documented secu-
rity loopholes. Finally, about 125 critical servers control
a disproportionate 10% of the overall namespace. Sur-
prisingly, 25 of these servers are operated by educational
institutions, which may not have adequate compulsion or
resources to ensure integrity.
Overall, this study shows that DNS has complex de-
pendencies, where a vulnerability in an obscure DNS
server may have far reaching consequences. For exam-
ple, the domain fbi.gov indirectly depends on a server be-
longing to telemail.net, which is vulnerable to four well-
known exploits. A malicious agent can easily compro-
mise that server, use it to hijack additional domains, and
ultimately take control of FBI’s namespace1.
The primary contribution of this paper is to expose
the inherent risks involved in a basic service in the In-
ternet. These risks create an artificial dilemma between
failure resilience, which argues for more geographically
distributed nameservers, and security, which argues for
fewer centralized trusted nodes. Our study indicates that
many network administrators may not be aware of this
dilemma, and thus make a poor tradeoff between failure
resilience and security.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The
next section provides some background on the delega-
tion based architecture of DNS. Section 3 presents the
1We have reported this vulnerability to the Department of Home-
land Security and the servers have since been upgraded; we do not
know if the vulnerability has been fixed.
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Figure 1: Delegation Graph: DNS exhibits complex inter-dependencies among nameservers due to its delegation based architecture. For
example, the domain name www.cs.cornell.edu depends indirectly on a nameserver in umich.edu. Arrows in the figure indicate dependences.
Self-loops and redundant dependencies have been omitted for clarity.
findings of our survey. We briefly relate other studies on
DNS in Section 4, and conclude with a discussion of the
impact of our findings in Section 5.
2 DNS Overview and Background
DNS namespace is hierarchically partitioned into non-
overlapping regions called domains. For example,
cs.cornell.edu is a sub-domain of cornell.edu, which in
turn is a sub-domain of the top-level domain edu, which
is under the global root domain. Names within a do-
main are served by a set of nodes called the authorita-
tive nameservers for that domain. In addition, authorita-
tive nameservers keep track of nameservers authoritative
for the sub-domains under this domain. At the top of
the DNS hierarchy are root nameservers and the author-
itative nameservers for top-level domains (TLDs). The
top-level domain namespace consists of generic TLDs
(gTLD), such as .com, .edu, and .net, and country-code
TLDs (ccTLD), such as .uk, .tr, and .in.
DNS uses a delegation based architecture for name
resolution [7, 8]. Clients resolve names by following
a chain of authoritative nameservers, starting from the
root, followed by the TLD nameservers, down to the
nameservers of the queried name. Following the delega-
tion chain requires additional name resolutions to be per-
formed in order to obtain the addresses of intermediate
nameservers2. Each of the additional name resolutions,
in turn, depends on a delegation chain.
Overall, these delegations induce complex non-
obvious dependencies among nameservers, and can
2While DNS uses glue records, which provide cached IP addresses
for nameservers, as an optimization, glue records are not authoritative.
cause unexpected nodes to exert great control over re-
mote domains. A name is said to depend on a name-
server if that nameserver could be involved in the reso-
lution of that name. Similarly, a nameserver is said to
control a name if the name can involve that nameserver
in its resolution. We represent the dependecies among
nameservers that directly or indirectly control a domain
name as a delegation graph. The delegation graph con-
sists of the transitive closure of all nameservers involved
in the resolution of a given name. The nameservers in
the delegation graph of a domain name forms the trusted
computing base (TCB) of that name.
Figure 1 illustrates the delegation interdependencies
for the name www.cs.cornell.edu. In addition to the
top-level domain nameservers, the resolution of this
name depends on twenty other nameservers, of which
only nine belong to the cornell.edu domain. Sev-
eral nameservers that are outside the administrative do-
main of Cornell have indirect control over Cornell’s
namespace. In this case, cornell.edu depends on
rochester.edu, which depends on wisc.edu, which in turn
depends on umich.edu. While Cornell directly trusts
cayuga.cs.rochester.edu to serve its namespace, it has no
control over the nameservers that rochester.edu trusts.
Compromise of one of those remote nameservers can
lead to a hijack of Cornell’s namespace.
3 Survey Results
We performed a large-scale survey to understand the
risks posed by DNS delegations. We collected 593160
unique webserver names by crawling the Yahoo! and
DMOZ.org web directories. These names are distributed
among 196 distinct top-level domains. Since the names
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Figure 2: Size of TCB: DNS Name resolution depends on a large
number of nameservers. On average, name resolution involves 46
nameservers, while a sizable fraction of names depend on more
than 100 nameservers.
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Figure 3: Average TCB Size for gTLD Names: Names in .aero
and .int have significantly larger TCBs.
were extracted from Web directories, we believe that
these names are representative of the sites people actu-
ally care about. We then queried DNS for these names
and recorded the chain of nameservers that are involved
in their resolution. A total of 166771 nameservers were
discovered in this process. We thus obtained a snap-
shot of the dependencies in DNS as it existed on July
22, 2004.
We study three different aspects of the dependencies
to quantify the security risks in DNS. First, we examine
the size of the trusted computing base for each name to
determine which names are most vulnerable. Second, we
study how software loopholes in DNS servers can be ex-
ploited to hijack domain names. Finally, we determine
the most valuable nameservers, which control large por-
tions of the namespace, and explore how securely they
are operated.
3.1 Most Vulnerable Names
The vulnerability of a DNS name is tied to the number
of servers in its trusted computing base, whose com-
promise could potentially misdirect clients seeking to
contact that server. Surely, it is not the case that all
of the nameservers are involved in every resolution of
that name; caching, network availability, load-balancing
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Figure 4: Average TCB Size for ccTLD Names: Some ccTLDs
rely on, and are vulnerable to compromises in, a large number of
nameservers.
decisions and the preferential order in each set of del-
egations together determine the precise set of contacts
for each query. However, under the right set of circum-
stances, say the severance of the wrong set of cables or
a targeted link saturation attack, any one of these nodes
can end up being queried and thus control the ultimate
mapping for that name.
Figure 2 plots the cumulative distribution of TCB sizes
for the domain names we surveyed. The sizes reported
here do not include the root nameservers, which belong
to the TCBs of all the domain names. Our survey shows
that TCB size follows a heavy-tailed distribution with a
median of 26 nameservers, and an average of 46 name-
servers; about 6.5% of the names has a TCB of greater
than 200 nameservers.
One might expect that the administrators of the pop-
ular domain names, predominantly belonging to big en-
terprises, would be better aware of the security risks and
keep their TCB sizes small. To test this hypothesis, we
separately plot the TCB sizes for the 500 most popu-
lar Web sites reported by alexa.org. The figure shows
that these names are more vulnerable; they depend on
69 nameservers on average, and 15% of them depend on
more than 200 nameservers.
Next, we study the TCB sizes for names belonging to
different TLDs. Figures 3 and 4 plot in decreasing order
the TCB sizes for names in the generic TLDs, and the
fifteen most vulnerable country-code TLDs, respectively.
Overall, ccTLD names have a much higher average TCB
size of 209 nameservers than gTLD names, whose aver-
age is 87 nameservers. GTLDs aero and int have con-
siderably larger TCBs than other gTLDs, and among the
ccTLDs Ukraine, Belarus, San Marino, Malta, Malaysia,
Poland and Italy, in that order, are the most vulnerable.
We manually examined the dependencies to determine
why certain domain names have much larger TCBs than
others. We find that names that are served by name-
servers in disparate domains have larger TCBs. Improv-
ing availability in the presence of network outages is one
of the primary reasons why administrators delegate to,
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Figure 5: Vulnerable Nameservers in TCB: 45% of the names
depend on at least one nameserverver with known vulnerability.
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Figure 6: Percentage of Non-Vulnerable Nodes in TCB: A few
names have their entire TCB vulnerable to known exploits.
and implicitly trust, nameservers outside their control.
Extending trust to a small number of nameservers that are
geographically distributed may provide high resilience
against failures. However, DNS forces them to have to
trust the entire transitive closure of the all names that ap-
pear in the physical delegation chains.
Sometimes even top-level domains are set up such
that it is impossible to own a name in that subdomain
and not depend on hundreds of nameservers. Ukrainian
names seem to suffer from many such dependencies. The
most vulnerable name in our survey, www.rkc.lviv.ua,
depends on nameservers in the US including Berkeley,
NYU, UCLA, as well as many locations spanning the
globe: Russia, Poland, Sweden, Norway, Germany, Aus-
tria, France, England, Canada, Israel, and Australia3. It is
likely that the Ukrainian authorities do not realize their
dependency on servers outside their control. A cracker
that controls a nameserver at Monash University in Aus-
tralia can end up controlling the resolution of the Web
site of Ukrainian government. DNS creates a small world
after all!
3A complete list of nameservers this name depends on can be found
in http://www.cs.cornell.edu/people/egs/beehive/dnssurvey.html. We
maintain an active Web site listing the results of the survey presented
here.
0 2 4 6 8 100
20
40
60
80
100
number of safe bottleneck nameservers
CD
F (
%)
All Names
Top 500 Names
Figure 7: DNS Nameserver Bottlenecks: 30% percentage of
names can be completely hijacked by compromising a critical set
of vulnerable bottleneck nameservers.
3.2 Impact of Known Exploits
As part of our survey, we also collected version informa-
tion for nameservers using BIND, the most widely-used
DNS server, where possible. Different versions of BIND
contain well-documented software bugs [4]. We com-
bine known vulnerabilities with the delegation graphs of
domain names to explore which names are easily sub-
jected to compromise. For nameservers whose vulnera-
bilities we do not know, we simply assume that they are
non-vulnerable; hence, the results presented here are op-
timistic.
Of the 166771 nameservers we surveyed, 27141 have
known vulnerabilities. A naive expectation might be
that, with 17% vulnerable nameservers, only 17% of the
names would be affected. Instead, these vulnerabilities
affect 264599 names, approximately 45%, because tran-
sitive trust relationships “poison” every path that passes
through an insecure nameserver.
For example, www.fbi.gov is vulnerable to being hi-
jacked, along with all other names in the fbi.gov do-
main. The fbi.gov domain is served by two machines
named dns.sprintip.com and dns2.sprintip.com. The
sprintip.com domain is in turn served by three ma-
chines named reston-ns[123].telemail.net. Of these ma-
chines, reston-ns2.telemail.net is running an old name-
server (BIND 8.2.4), with four different known exploits
against it (namely, libbind, negcache, sigrec, DoS multi,
exploits) [4]. Having compromised reston-ns2 using a
standard crack tool available on the web, an attacker can
divert a query for dns.sprintip.com to a malicious name-
server, which can then divert queries for www.fbi.gov to
any other address, hijacking the FBI’s web site and ser-
vices.
Figure 5 shows the cumulative distribution of the num-
ber of vulnerable nameservers in the TCBs of surveyed
names. 45% of DNS names depend on at least one vul-
nerable nameserver, and can be compromised by launch-
ing well-known, scripted attacks. Figure 6 shows the per-
centage of nodes with no known bugs in the TCBs of sur-
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Figure 8: Number of Names Controlled by Nameservers: Some
nameservers with known vulnerabilities control a large percentage
of names.
veyed names. Surprisingly, a few names do not have any
non-vulnerable nameservers in their TCB; these names
belong to the ccTLD ws, which relies on older buggy
versions of BIND. Overall, the average number of vul-
nerable nameservers is 4.1, about 9% of the average size
of TCBs. The extent of vulnerability in the TCBs of the
500 most popular names is also high (7.6), about 11% of
the average TCB size.
It is useful to distinguish between partial and complete
hijacks. In a partial hijack, an attacker who compromises
a nameserver can divert some queries for the targeted
name, whereas a complete hijack is guaranteed to divert
all queries for that name. We examined the chances of a
complete domain hijack by counting the minimum num-
ber of nameservers that need to be attacked in order to
completely take over a domain. Such critical bottleneck
nameservers can be determined by computing a min-cut
of the delegation graph.
Figure 7 shows the number of non-vulnerable name-
servers in the min-cut of the delegation graphs. Surpris-
ingly, about 30% of domain names have a min-cut con-
sisting entirely of vulnerable nameservers. The average
size of a min-cut is 2.5 nameservers. This implies that
these domain names can be completely hijacked by com-
promising less than three machines on average. More-
over, another 10% of domain names have only one non-
vulnerable nameserver in their min-cut. A denial of ser-
vice attack on the non-vulnerable nameserver, coupled
with the compromise of the other vulnerable bottleneck
nameservers, is sufficient to completely hijack these do-
mains.
3.3 Most Valuable Nameservers
The value of a DNS nameserver is tied to the role it plays
in name resolution. We model the value of a nameserver
as being proportional to the number of domain names
which depend on that nameserver. It is these high profile
servers whose compromise would put the largest portions
of the DNS namespace in jeopardy. Attackers are likely
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Figure 9: Number of Names Controlled by Nameservers in .edu
and .org Domains: Some nameservers in educational institutions
and non-profit organizations control large percentage of names.
to focus their energies on such high-leverage servers; if
the effort to break into a vulnerable nameserver is con-
stant, then breaking into a nameserver that controls a
large number of names provides a higher payoff.
Figure 8 shows the number of names controlled by
nameservers, ranked in the order of importance. It also
gives a distribution of names controlled by nameservers
with known exploits. An average nameserver is involved
in the resolution of 166 externally visible names, and the
median is 4. This is the number of externally visible
names that appear in well-known web directories, and
does not include automatically generated DHCP names
or other DNS names that receive few, if any, lookups.
While an attacker targeting random nameservers
would likely compromise only a few sites, a little bit
of targeting can yield nameservers with great leverage.
Figure 8 shows that about 125 nameservers each control
more than 10% of the surveyed names. Of these high
profile nameservers, only about 30 are well-maintained
gTLD nameservers. Several vulnerable nameservers
control large portions of the namespace; about 12 of
the 125 high profile nameservers have well-known loop-
holes.
There are many valuable nameservers operated by in-
stitutions that may not be equipped to or willing to take
on the DNS task. Figure 9 shows a distribution of names
served by machines belonging to the .edu and .org do-
mains. These nameservers are operated by entities such
as universities, non-profit organizations, and so forth,
whose primary business is not to provide networking
services. These institutions, unlike ISPs, typically do
not have a financial relationship with the owners of the
names they serve, and thus lack the fiduciary incentives
for providing correct, secure service that an ISP has.
These institutions take on an additional risk by placing
their servers at critical locations in the DNS hierarchy;
they may be liable if their servers are taken over and used
to hijack a DNS domain.
5
4 Related Work
Several surveys and measurement studies have been per-
formed on DNS. However, they have typically focused
on the performance and availability of DNS.
In 1988, Mockapetris and Dunlap published a retro-
spective study on the development of DNS identifying its
successful features and shortcomings [9]. Several mea-
surement studies since then have provided good insight
into the performance of the system. A detailed study of
the effectiveness of caching on lookup performance is
presented by Jung et al. in [6, 5]. Park et al. [11] ex-
plore the different causes for performance delays seen
by DNS clients. Huitema and Weerahandi [3] and Wills
and Shang [15] study the impact of DNS delays on Web
downloads. The impact of server selection on DNS de-
lays is measured by Shaikh et al. [13].
Two recent surveys by Pappas et al. [10] and Rama-
subramanian and Sirer [12] focus on availability limita-
tions of DNS stemming from its hierarchical structure.
These studies show that most domain names are served
by a small number of nameservers, whose failure or com-
promise prevents resolution for the names they control.
This paper studies a fundamentally different, yet cru-
cial, aspect of DNS design: the security vulnerabilities
that stem from the delegation based architecture of DNS.
It exposes the risks posed by non-obvious dependencies
among DNS servers, and highlights the tradeoff between
availability and security.
5 Discussion and Summary
DNS is a complex system, where a vulnerability in an
obscure nameserver can have far-reaching consequences,
and trust relationships are hard to specify and bound.
Even if the name owners are diligent and check the ex-
tent of dependencies at the time of name creation, trust
relationships can change undetected.
The main culprit here is the reliance on transitive
trust [14]. DNS defines a dependency graph, and con-
cerns, including failure resilience and independent ad-
ministration, enable the resulting dependence graphs to
grow large and change dynamically. It is a well-accepted
axiom of computer security that a small trusted comput-
ing base is highly desirable, since smaller TCBs are eas-
ier to secure, audit and manage. Our survey finds that
the TCB in DNS is large and can include more than 400
nodes. An average name depends on 46 nameservers,
while the average in some top-level domains exceeds
200.
This study shows that one in three Internet names can
be hijacked using publicly-known exploits. This points
to the Domain Name System as a significant common
vulnerability. It is highly unlikely that an attacker can
break into a third of the webservers around the globe;
firewalls, hardened kernels, and intrusion detection tools
deter direct attacks on webservers. But DNS enables at-
tackers to hijack one in three sites, thus gaining the abil-
ity to masquerade as the original site, obtain access to
their clients, potentially collect passwords, and possibly
spread misinformation. High-profile domains, including
those belonging to the FBI and many popular sites, are
vulnerable because of problems stemming from the way
DNS performs delegations.
A better approach is required to achieve name secu-
rity on the Internet. Deployment of DNSSEC [1, 2] can
help, but DNSSEC continues to rely on the same phys-
ical delegation chains as DNS during lookups. While
DNSSEC enables detection of integrity violations, mali-
cious agents could still easily disrupt name service. As
a stopgap measure, network administrators have to be
aware of the vulnerabilities in DNS and be more diligent
about where they place their trust.
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